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Note
Voting-Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look
at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon
Disfranchisement Laws
Angela Behrens*
Voting is a fundamental right in the United States, yet in
the 2004 presidential election, over five million people were un-
able to cast a vote because of a felony conviction at some point
in their lives.1 Felon disfranchisement laws remove the right to
vote based on a felony conviction. While disfranchisement laws
vary by state, the laws collectively account for the largest group
of American citizens unable to vote. 2 The existence of these
laws therefore calls into question the notion of voting as a fun-
damental right.
The refusal of some states to extend the right to vote to
persons convicted of a felony-level offense has prompted calls
for reform. This Note explores both the legal and legislative
challenges to state felon disfranchisement laws, questioning
how the persistence of these laws squares with the notion of
voting as a fundamental right. Part I first discusses briefly the
progression of the right to vote toward near-universal status in
the United States before giving an overview of felon disfran-
chisement and the debates sparked by these laws. Part I also
presents some of the unsuccessful legal challenges to felon dis-
, J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Andy Pratt, David
Schultz, Ryan Stai, and Chris Uggen for their helpful comments and sugges-
tions.
1. Christopher Uggen et al., Estimated Disenfranchised Felon Popula-
tion by State 2004 (2004) (unpublished statistics, on file with author); see also
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV.
777, 797 (2002) (using the same methodology to estimate that 4.7 million peo-
ple were disfranchised for the 2000 election).
2. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 308 (2000). Felon disfranchisement
laws remove the right to vote in local, state, and federal elections.
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franchisement and the successful legislative reforms in recent
years. Part II juxtaposes felon disfranchisement laws with tra-
ditional voting rights cases, arguing that the former category
should receive the same standard of review as the latter, and
that courts should protect the voting rights of persons convicted
of a felony at the same fundamental level as other citizens. Part
II notes the weaknesses in justifications for these laws and il-
lustrates how, if applied, felon disfranchisement laws cannot
withstand a strict scrutiny standard of review. Finally, Part III
argues that although some state legislatures have recently nar-
rowed the scope of their felon disfranchisement laws, courts
remain the appropriate forum for change.
I. ENFRANCHISING AND DISFRANCHISING IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. THE PROGRESSIVE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
The right to vote in the United States is among the funda-
mental rights adult citizens possess in contemporary society.3
While the country has a long history of exclusionary practices
with regard to suffrage, 4 in the past two centuries the right to
vote has been extended to more groups and has gained increas-
ing protection, such that most consider voting a fundamental
right.5
The United States Constitution originally left the determi-
nation of voting rights entirely to state power. Many states im-
posed restrictions on this right, often requiring taxpaying or
property ownership as a prerequisite to vote, in addition to us-
3. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
4. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 2 (discussing the history of voting
rights in the United States); KENT REDDING, MAKING RACE, MAKING POWER:
NORTH CAROLINA'S ROAD TO DISFRANCHISEMENT (2003) (discussing how the
elite class of North Carolina used their power to disfranchise minorities over
time); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO
DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960) (discussing voting rights in the United States
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
5. See infra notes 15-24. Although this Note discusses voting as a right,
some view voting as a privilege and that there are legally-recognized limita-
tions on the right to vote. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 231 (R.B. McCallum ed.,
Basil Blackwell 1946) (1869) (calling suffrage a "trust," rather than a right);
Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 172 (2001) (noting
that "[v]oting is a right, but it is also a privilege"). See infra note 24 for some
examples of legal limitations on the right to vote.
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ing sex- and religion-based restrictions. 6 States also used race-
based distinctions to limit the franchise to whites. 7 Throughout
the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, several
developments at the federal level curbed states' ability to limit
voting to selected groups. Following the Civil War, the Four-
teenth8 and Fifteenth9 Amendments extended the right to vote
to all males and eliminated legal permission to disfranchise
based explicitly on race.
Although the Constitution barred race-based disfranchise-
ment by 1870, the implementation of disfranchising measures
throughout the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries is well-
documented. States strategically circumvented legal barriers to
undermine the spirit of the new amendments and to prevent
racial minorities, particularly African Americans, from vot-
ing. 10 In response, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act" in
1965 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and eliminate racial
discrimination in voting. 12 Congress amended and reauthorized
the Act in 1970 and 1982,13 and the Act now requires a results-
6. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 2 (discussing state suffrage qualifi-
cations in early and contemporary America); WILLIAMSON, supra note 4 (dis-
cussing state suffrage qualifications in early American history).
7. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 2 (discussing race restrictions and
the limitation of voting rights to whites throughout American history);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4 (discussing the same).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. Id. amend. XV.
10. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 105-16 (detailing efforts to disfranchise
racial minorities); see generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE:
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION (1999) (discussing voting rights during the Reconstruction
Era); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910
(1974) (recounting the development of Southern politics post-Reconstruction).
11. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
12. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)
("The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of ra-
cial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts
of our country for nearly a century."). A 1959 report indicated that in the
South, only about twenty-five percent of the eligible African American voting-
age population was registered to vote, compared to nearly sixty percent of the
eligible white voting-age population. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 40-41 (1959).
13. Despite passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, it soon became clear
that the Act was not effective in eliminating racial discrimination with regard
to the right to vote. A 1975 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights de-
tailed a range of tactics used by election officials to deny voting rights to racial
minorities. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN
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based test applying the "totality of circumstances" to all claims
of racial discrimination arising under the statute.' 4
Thus, by the mid-1960s, states had lost significant power
to define voter qualifications, and could no longer disfranchise
based on race, 15 sex,16 or wealth,17 and, nationally, the voting
age had been lowered.1 8 A series of Supreme Court decisions
confirmed this new protection of the franchise as it struck down
other restrictions on suffrage, such as poll taxes, 19 residency
requirements, 20 and literacy tests.21 In Reynolds v. Sims, 22 the
YEARS AFTER 98-104 (1975). Similarly, a 1981 report detailed the negative
impact of restrictive registration practices on minorities. U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 28-31 (1981);
see also STEPHEN L. WASBY, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, VOTE
DILUTION, MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS, AND THE COURTS 1 (1982) (noting that
since initial passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, "the bolder forms of vot-
ing discrimination have largely given way to more subtle means").
14. The Voting Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and presently
reads, in pertinent part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied.., in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color .... (b) A violation of
subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (emphasis added).
For application of subdivision (b) of the Act under the 1982 amendment,
commonly referred to as section 2, see, for example, Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 394 (1991) and Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Prior to the 1982 amendment, a showing of dis-
criminatory intent was required to prove a violation of the Voting Rights Act.
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). Under the results-based
standard, the Court has noted that "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a cer-
tain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives." Thornburg, 478 U.S. at
42.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
17. Id. amend. XXIV.
18. Id. amend. XXVI (lowering the minimum voting age to eighteen years
of age).
19. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
20. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
21. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibited the enforcement of a New York
[89:231
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Court stressed the significance of the right to vote in a democ-
racy:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the fran-
chise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citi-
zens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.23
As a fundamental right, restrictions on the right to vote
are therefore subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review;
states may limit the right only to serve a compelling state in-
terest through narrowly-tailored means. 24
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Although the right to vote gained increasing constitutional
protection in the past two centuries, felon disfranchisement
laws have retained a strong presence in the United States.
Forty-eight states now disfranchise those convicted of a felony
for some length of time.25 In contrast to the general expansion
of voting rights, felon disfranchisement laws developed in such
a manner as to restrict the size of the electorate.
statutory requirement of English literacy for enfranchisement).
22. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. Id. at 561-62. The Court made similar proclamations in Kramer v.
Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), noting that "the defer-
ence usually given to the judgment of legislators does not extend to decisions
concerning which resident citizens may participate in the election of legisla-
tors and other public officials" and in Harper, 383 U.S. at 668, condemning
classifications that are "not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process."
24. The Court has upheld some restrictions on the right to vote. For ex-
ample, the right does not extend to non-state citizens. Pope v. Williams, 193
U.S. 621, 633 (1904). The Court has also upheld some residency requirements.
See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (upholding a fifty-day
durational residency requirement as a condition to register and to vote). But
cf. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 353 (striking down a one-year durational residency re-
quirement). The Court has also allowed restrictions on the franchise in some
special purpose elections. See Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 731 (1973) (upholding a California statute limit-
ing the right to vote in water storage district elections to landowners); cf.
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 633 (holding that New York did not have a sufficiently
compelling state interest in limiting school district elections to property own-
ers and parents).
25. Maine and Vermont are the only states that do not disfranchise felons
for any length of time. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (August 2004), available
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.
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1. Early Disfranchisement Laws in the United States
The concept of imposing disfranchisement as a conse-
quence to a criminal act dates back to colonial times in the
United States26 and stems from European models.27 In addition
to punishment, disfranchisement was among the many civil
disabilities imposed for violating a social norm.28 Disfranchise-
ment was thought to serve both as a form of retribution and as
a deterrent from crime. 29 Disfranchisement and other collateral
consequences included a very public component, serving as
both general and specific deterrents "because the stigma of the
loss of civil rights in the small communities of those times in-
creased the humiliation and isolation suffered by the offender
and his family and served as a warning to the rest of the com-
munity, all of whom probably knew the offender."30 Losing the
right to vote, however, was limited to few crimes and imposed
only by judicial mandate. 31
In the United States, disfranchisement was among the re-
tained European legal vestiges. Colonial laws in the 1600s and
1700s often disfranchised for "moral" violations, such as drunk-
enness and fornication.32 Some acts, such as bribing an elected
official, resulted in permanent disfranchisement, while other
acts imposed temporary periods of disfranchisement. 33 As the
country took shape at the end of the eighteenth century and
throughout the nineteenth century, many states incorporated
criminal disfranchisement provisions into their constitutions at
statehood.34 The provisions, however, were typically either lim-
26. See Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death" The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059-
63 (drawing upon colonial examples of seventeenth and eighteenth century
laws that imposed disfranchisement based on "moral qualifications").
27. See Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-
Offender's Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
721, 721-24 (1973) (discussing European responses to crime through civil
death, outlawry, infamy, and attainder); see also KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at
162-63.
28. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 726-27. Violations could be
of either a legal or a moral norm. Id. at 726.
29. Id. at 726-27; see also Ewald, supra note 26, at 1059-63.
30. Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 726-27. These forms of punish-
ment were alternative to other public forms of punishment, such as hanging
and mutilation. Id. at 726.
31. Ewald, supra note 26, at 1061.
32. Id. at 1061-62.
33. Id. at 1062.
34. Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro
[89:231
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ited in scope 35 or granted the state legislature the power to pass
laws disfranchising based on crime. 36 Until the mid-nineteenth
century few states had laws that broadly disfranchised for fel-
ony convictions.
2. Moving Toward Widespread Disfranchisement in the
United States
By 1850, eleven of the thirty-two states disfranchised
based on a felony conviction. 37 In 1870, however, twenty-eight
of the then thirty-eight states had such laws. 38 The period fol-
lowing the Civil War was one of particular change.3 9 Some
states incorporated new disfranchisement laws into revised
state constitutions, while legislatures in other states began us-
ing longstanding constitutional provisions that enabled them to
pass disfranchisement laws. 40 Most new states entered the Un-
ion with a felon disfranchisement law.41 Not only had the sheer
number of disfranchising states increased, but the nature of the
laws had changed as well. Rather than barring a small offense-
specific group from voting, laws began to encompass all felo-
nies, without attention to the underlying crime.42 In addition,
most of these laws provided for indefinite disfranchisement,
typically requiring a gubernatorial pardon to restore the
right.43 In some cases, the right was never restored. 44
Paired with the expansion and formalization of the crimi-
Domination" Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOc. 559, 565-66 (2003).
35. Common crimes resulting in disfranchisement included perjury and
bribery. Ewald, supra note 26, at 1064. Vermont, for example, disfranchised
those convicted of an election crime (giving or receiving bribes) for the election
related to the offense. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 55 (1793).
36. Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 564-66. Florida's 1838 constitution,
for example, gave its General Assembly the "power to exclude.., from the
right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous
crime." FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1838).
37. Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 564-66.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
40. Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 564-66.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 563 for a discussion of the growth of broad-sweeping felon
disfranchisement laws in the United States during the mid- to late-nineteenth
century.
43. See id. at 564.
44. Id.
2004]
238 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:231
nal justice system in the nineteenth century45 and the uniquely
high incarceration rate the United States attained throughout
the twentieth century, 46 felon disfranchisement laws now en-
compass a large population. Further, because states hold the
power to define crimes and designate various levels of of-
fenses, 47 the definition of "felony" has vastly expanded. 48 In ad-
dition to any internal impact on the disfranchised population, 49
the group has reached a critical size and holds the potential to
change election outcomes. 50
45. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1993) (giving a comprehensive history of the development
of the criminal justice system in the United States).
46. In 2002, the United States' incarceration rate was 701 inmates per
100,000 residents. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2002, at 2 (2003).
This rate far exceeds those in other nations. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Compara-
tive International Rates of Incarceration, at 2, available at http://www.
november.org/stayinfo/breaking/Incarceration.pdf (comparing the incarcera-
tion rates of fourteen nations); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE
(1999) (giving a comprehensive overview of incarceration in the United States
and its connection to race and class) [hereinafter MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE]. Incarceration rates in the United States were much lower until
the 1970s, when the rate began to grow steadily. Id. at 17, 83.
47. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) ("The States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.").
48. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Re-
flections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899 (1999)
(noting that at common law, the defining characteristic of a felony was that
the offense was subject to capital punishment, whereas the modern definition
of felony "implies simply that the offense is subject to punishment by a year or
more in prison").
49. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen et al., "Less than the Average Citizen"
Stigma, Role Transition, and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in
AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION
261, 275-79 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004) (discussing the
symbolic meaning of disfranchisement through interviews with disfranchised
persons); see also Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and 'The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301
(1989) (arguing that disfranchisement is "driven... by an atavistic and deep-
rooted social need to define the boundaries of the community by stigmatizing
some persons as outsiders"); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 333, 368 (1993) (arguing that voting is an expressive act
that may give a voter "a sense of belonging, transcendence, and dignity that
comes from being a valued member of the society").
50. Uggen & Manza, supra note 1, at 787-90, 792. A counterfactual
analysis, accounting for voter turnout rates and voter preferences illustrates
how disfranchisement laws likely would have changed the outcome of the 2000
presidential election, as well as a number of U.S. Senate elections, which
would have altered the overall partisan composition of the Senate in the
1990s. Id.
2004] FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
3. The Current State of Felon Disfranchisement Laws in the
United States
To date, Maine and Vermont are the only states that allow
people to vote even while incarcerated. 51 The remaining forty-
eight states typically disfranchise according to one of four re-
gimes: (1) disfranchisement while incarcerated; 52 (2) disfran-
chisement while incarcerated or on parole;5 3 (3) disfranchise-
ment while serving a sentence (while incarcerated, or on parole
or probation);5 4 or (4) disfranchisement beyond completion of
sentence. 55 Some states in the latter category make further dis-
tinctions, but, for the most part disfranchise some people for a
period that exceeds any amount of correctional supervision.
56
The contemporary effect of disfranchisement laws is the
creation of a class of over five million people in the United
States who cannot vote because of a felony conviction, a class
that constitutes over two percent of the total voting-age popula-
tion.57 While other countries disfranchise some people convicted
51. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Although the incarcerated
population in Maine and Vermont may not be legally disfranchised, incarcera-
tion itself often poses practical limitations on voting. See, e.g., STEVEN
KALOGERAS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JAIL-BASED VOTER REGISTRATION
CAMPAIGNS 3 (2003) (detailing the difficulty of registering to vote or obtaining
an absentee ballot while incarcerated). Utah and Massachusetts most recently
added provisions in 1998 and 2000, respectively, to disfranchise prison in-
mates. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
52. The thirteen states in this group are Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, supra note 25.
53. The four states in this group are California, Colorado, Connecticut,
and New York. Id.
54. The seventeen states in this group are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
55. The fourteen states in this group are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennes-
see, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
56. Many states make distinctions based on the type of offense or previous
commission of a felony or require waiting periods before restoring voting
rights. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (2004) (restoring rights five years after
completion of sentence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-912 (West Supp. 2003)
(disfranchising only recidivists beyond completion of sentence); MD. CODE
ANN., ELECTION LAW § 3-102 (2003) (distinguishing between violent offenders
and non-violent offenders, and recidivists and first-time offenders); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 213.157 (Michie 2003) (discussing similar distinctions).
57. Uggen et al., supra note 1. While this estimate uses legal provisions to
determine the size of the disfranchised population, the population that is prac-
240 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:231
of crimes, the United States easily surpasses the international
norm both in its rates and duration of disfranchisement. 58
Thus, as a democratic country that heralds citizen participation
in government and has increasingly protected the right to vote,
the United States has simultaneously produced a contradictory
trend of increasing and widespread disfranchisement.
C. WHO SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE? THE DEBATES
SURROUNDING FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT
Until recently, felon disfranchisement laws have, for the
most part, retained a silent presence, with the issue receiving
scant attention.59 Several themes recur in current debates over
tically disfranchised (as opposed to legally) may be even larger, as election of-
ficials are often misinformed about their state law and deny the right to those
who legally should be able to vote. See, e.g., Wayne Hoffman, Some Counties
May Not Let Felons Vote, IDAHO STATESMAN, Aug. 25, 2003, at 1 (reporting
that nearly one-third of the state's county election offices erroneously assumed
that anyone with a felony conviction was permanently disfranchised; in Idaho,
rights are restored upon completion of sentence); Marie McCain, Getting Out
the Vote for Ex-Cons: Initiative Aims to Fix Misconception that Rights Never
Restored, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Aug. 9, 2004, at 1A (discussing
how many people in Minnesota are unaware that they regain their voting
rights upon completion of sentence). Prior to the 2000 presidential election,
officials in Florida purged from voting registries, or blocked from registering,
tens of thousands of people who had had their voting rights restored and were
otherwise eligible to vote. Gregory Palast, Florida's "Disappeared Voters"." Dis-
enfranchised by the GOP, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 20. Prior to the 2004 presi-
dential election, only the threat of litigation finally convinced the state to stop
using the so-called "purge list" fraught with error. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Klas et
al., State Drops Felon-Voter List, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2004, at 1A; Thou-
sands of Eligible Voters on Florida Purge List (National Public Radio Broad-
cast, July 2, 2004). Although people in jail awaiting trial are legally able to
vote, the fact of confinement often makes it difficult to vote. KALOGERAS, supra
note 51, at 3.
58. See generally BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS, INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTION
SYS., INCARCERATION AND ENFRANCHISEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES,
IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM (2003) for an overview of inter-
national disfranchisement laws. Of countries that disfranchise, most do so
only for narrowly-tailored crimes, in case-specific situations, and for a limited
amount of time. Id.; see generally Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on
One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an
Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000) (describing stringent restrictions on
German courts' ability to limit former offenders' voting rights); Christopher
Manfredi, Judicial Review and Criminal Disenfranchisement in the United
States and Canada, 60 REV. POL. 277 (1998) (comparing the trend in the
United States to allow states to disfranchise former offenders with increasing
Canadian leniency in restoring voting rights).
59. The Sentencing Project, a research and advocacy organization in
Washington, D.C., Dgmos, a public policy organization in New York City, and
Right to Vote, a national coalition of eight organizations, are among the or-
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the laws. Opponents of disfranchisement argue that voting is a
fundamental right of a democracy, that the laws are unfair and
an international anomaly, and that the laws have a suspect
history and create a disparate racial impact. Proponents of dis-
franchisement, in contrast, argue that a criminal conviction
represents a violation of the social contract that merits disfran-
chisement, and that disfranchisement laws are race-neutral
both on their face and in their application.
1. The Right to Vote as a Fundamental Aspect of Democracy
Regardless of its exercise, the right to vote holds meaning.
Those with a felony conviction remain citizens of their country
and state, but a conviction generally divorces the concomitant
right to vote from their status as citizens. Voting provides a
means of expression and gives citizens the ability to choose
those who will govern them.60 Without this right, the governed
population has no opportunity to challenge laws to which they
are subjected. The loss of voting rights, then, essentially shifts
a citizen to a second-class status.6 1 Disfranchisement of those
who have completed their sentence, and to a lesser extent all
non-incarcerated persons, has been targeted as a particularly
egregious practice in this respect. 62
In opposition to this view, supporters of disfranchisement
argue that committing a crime violates the social contract, and
ganizations now actively tracking the issue of felon disfranchisement. See
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004);
http://www.demos-usa.org/votingrights/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2004);
http://www.righttovote.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2004); see also Miles
Rapoport & Jason Tarricone, Election Reform's Next Phase: A Broad Democ-
racy Agenda and the Need for a Movement, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
379, 396 (2002). Rapoport and Tarricone comment, "Only a few years ago, ex-
felons who wanted to regain their fundamental right to vote had few vocal ad-
vocates. Now ... momentum for restoring voting rights to ex-felons is building
in many states across the country." Id.
60. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that vot-
ing preserves all other rights).
61. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 48, at 1907 (discussing how disfran-
chisement impedes reintegration); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 753
(commenting on the "criminal taint" disfranchisement leaves on people who
have fully completed a criminal sentence); Uggen et al., supra note 49, at 268-
72 (quoting some disfranchised persons' sentiments about the collateral conse-
quences of a conviction); see also infra note 67.
62. Rapoport & Tarricone, supra note 59, at 393-94 (noting that disfran-
chising people past completion of sentence "erodes our democracy" because the
laws "oppose[ ] two core American values: the democratic right to vote and the
ability of the individual to leave the past behind and start a new life").
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disfranchisement is a logical and fair consequence to that viola-
tion. A social contract perspective posits that all citizens are
parties to an implicit contract to abide by the law and those
who breach that contract rescind their right to participate in
the political sphere of society.63 Under this theory, anyone who
has committed a crime cannot be trusted to vote responsibly or
to promote the interests of the state.64 Further, it is argued, of-
fenders chose their status; in choosing to act criminally, the
choice was also made to forfeit the right to vote.65 Letting this
group vote is unfair, it then follows, because their votes would
dilute the votes of "law-abiding citizens."66 States impose mul-
tiple other collateral consequences for criminal convictions,6 7
63. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION § 11, at 7-8 (J. W. Gough ed., Basil Black-
well 1947) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 35
(Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1762) (noting
that when a person "has broken the social treaty... he is no longer a member
of the state").
64. Clegg, supra note 5, at 172 (commenting that "[lt is not too much to
demand that those who would make the laws for others-who would partici-
pate in self-government-be willing to follow those laws themselves"). Clegg
asserts that voters must be trustworthy and loyal and that enfranchisement is
"hardly in the interests of a neighborhood's law-abiding citizens." Id. at 174,
177.
65. See id. at 177; see also Jeb Bush, Comment, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB.
NEWSCOAST, Jan. 11, 2001 (on file with author). In defense of his state's strin-
gent restoration process, the Florida Governor has commented that "[a]ny per-
son, black or white, who could not legally vote in the last election due to his or
her status as a felon could have retained the right to vote by simply not com-
mitting a felony in the first place." Id.
66. See Clegg, supra note 5, at 177; see also 148 CONG. REC. S797, S802
(daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("States have a signifi-
cant interest in reserving the vote for those who have abided by the social con-
tract.").
67. The collateral consequences following a felony conviction reach well
beyond the loss of voting rights. Most states exclude those with a conviction
from serving on a jury, running for public office, or owning a firearm. A felony
conviction also creates limitations in finding housing or receiving welfare, and
can serve as grounds for divorce or termination of parental rights. See, e.g.,
Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65,
67-70 (2003); Kathleen Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Fel-
ony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10 (1997); Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner's
Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to Hold Public Of-
fice, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801, 801-03 (2003); see also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 253, 253 (2002) (likening the consequences of a conviction to an invisible
"ton of bricks").
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and supporters of disfranchisement frequently point to these
restrictions as additional support for their position, particularly
limitations on gun possession. 68
Critics of disfranchisement charge that this view of the so-
cial contract is narrow and outdated, 69 and that a new contract
forms upon placement back in the community, one that should
not include disfranchisement. 70 Another critique stresses the
lack of any nexus between the disfranchising crime and the
propensity to vote "irresponsibly."71 Roger Clegg, general coun-
sel at the Center for Equal Opportunity and a supporter of dis-
franchisement, has commented that "[i]f these laws did not ex-
ist there would be a real danger of creating an anti-law
enforcement voting bloc in municipal elections."72 One disfran-
chised prison inmate, however, aptly challenged that logic
when participating in an interview:
[Disfranchisement] seems so asinine to me .... [T]hey have the ex-
pectation that you're going to reintegrate back into society, become a
functioning, contributing member of society. But yet you're not al-
lowed to have a say-so. Where's the logic in that? And, what is the fear
that someone who has committed a felony would actually have a voice?
I mean are they afraid we're all going to band together and vote for the
68. See, e.g., Jim Sloan, Debate Continues over Felons' Voting, TAMPA
TRIB., Dec. 17, 2000, at 14 (quoting Todd Gaziano, an attorney at the Heritage
Foundation: "Felons can't possess firearms, either, and that's a clear constitu-
tional right .... [T]hose folks who want felons to be able to vote are not clam-
oring to overturn ... laws prohibiting felons from owning guns."); see also
Lowell Ponte, Jesse Jackson: A Real Con Man, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE.COM
(July 18, 2003), at http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=8979
(discussing the same).
69. Note, supra note 49, at 1305-07; see generally Ewald, supra note 26
(discussing how both traditional liberal and republican notions should lead to
supporting enfranchisement).
70. Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Uncon-
scionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109, 133 (2003) (using tra-
ditional contract concepts to argue that a second social contract forms when a
person reenters the community, and that, because the disfranchised person
has unequal bargaining power, this contract is invalid based on the doctrine of
unconscionability).
71. See Note, supra note 49, at 1303 (calling the rationale of preventing
voter fraud by disfranchising felons "overinclusive"); Mark E. Thompson, Com-
ment, Don't Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 167, 190-93 (2002) (commenting on the illogical nexus between
the commission of a felony and the propensity to commit an election offense);
see also LORI MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, DkMOS, SECURING THE VOTE: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTION FRAUD (2003) (finding that no significant threat of vot-
ing fraud exists).
72. Clegg, supra note 5, at 177.
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wrong guy? I mean it's ridiculous. You know, we're going to have some
organized crime guy running for office, and we're all going to get be-
hind him? ... It makes no sense to me.7 3
Finally, many find the idea that a single conviction may
have lifelong repercussions particularly troublesome, 74 and also
point to the stark contrast between the United States and other
democratic countries on the issue of felon disfranchisement.7 5
2. The Racial Origins and Impact of Felon Disfranchisement
The most frequently recurring arguments against felon dis-
franchisement laws center on their connection to race. Al-
though the laws are facially race-neutral, their history is tied to
racial politics and they interact with other processes in the
criminal justice system to create a disparate racial impact, par-
ticularly for the African American community.7 6
Numerous disparate impacts exist within the events that
necessarily precede a felony conviction. Stereotypes about po-
tential criminals 77 lead to racial profiling and disparate arrest
73. Interview by Christopher Uggen with a male inmate in his late twen-
ties, Minnesota prison (Apr. 11, 2001) (emphasis added) (on file with author);
see also Marc Mauer, Disenfranchisement of Felons: The Modern-Day Voting
Rights Challenge, C.R. J., Winter 2002, at 40. Using a hypothetical "pro-
burglary" felon, Mauer highlights procedural flaws in the "voting-bloc" argu-
ment. In addition to finding a supportive candidate and garnering enough vot-
ers to elect that candidate, the candidate would then have to persuade legisla-
tors and the state governor to pass new "pro-burglary" laws. Mauer, supra, at
42. Mauer concludes, "[t]his hardly seems like a substantial threat to the
safety of the community." Id.
74. Johnson-Parris, supra note 70, at 131 (commenting that "[t]he sanc-
tion of disfranchisement is essentially a forfeiture of a very important right for
a single type of breach of the social contract"); Symposium, Constitutional
Lawyering in the 21st Century, 9 J.L. & POLY 209, 283 (2001). Professor
Melissa Saunders has commented that:
Numerous felons are disenfranchised for life for having committed
one minor felony offense early on in their adolescence. That strikes
me as something that we should be very concerned about as a democ-
racy. It is an area in which we are dramatically out of step with the
rest of the world.
Id.
75. JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING
THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 17-18 (1998), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org
pdfs/9080.pdf.
76. Of the nearly 4.7 million people disfranchised for the 2000 presiden-
tial election, over 1.8 million were African Americans, representing almost
7.5% of the African-American voting-age population. Uggen & Manza, supra
note 1, at 798. In sixteen states, that percentage exceeded ten percent. Id.
77. See generally Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Composition of Neighborhood
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rates, 78 and a disparity is also evident in conviction rates 79 and
decisions to incarcerate.80 All of these factors therefore create a
pool of disfranchised persons that includes a disproportionate
number of racial minorities. Because applying felon disfran-
chisement laws on top of the circumstances surrounding a fel-
ony conviction results in the dilution of racial minorities' voting
power, the argument continues that courts should therefore in-
validate these laws because they violate the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, as well as section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.8 '
Supporters of disfranchisement stress the race-neutral
language of the laws, arguing that there is no causal connection
between the laws and the racial impact and that "there are
non-racial reasons for disfranchising criminals."8 2 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a disparate impact
and Fear of Crime, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1997) (finding a relationship be-
tween the percentage of young African American males in a neighborhood and
white residents' fear of crime); Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black
Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of
Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. Soc. 717 (2001) (discussing the same).
78. MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE, supra note 46, at 126-36.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 48, at 1901-02 (noting that disfran-
chisement runs contrary to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
that "use of disenfranchisement violates that conception of democratic equality
that we have developed since the Civil War"); Virginia E. Hench, The Death of
Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 727, 738 (1998) (discussing the racially discriminatory roots of
disfranchisement); Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement
and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1145, 1178 (1994) (arguing that the totality of circumstances test under
the Voting Rights Act holds the potential to defeat felon disfranchisement
laws); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement
Under the Voting Rights Act, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 553 (1993) (discussing the
same).
82. Clegg, supra note 5, at 169; see also Jesse Katz, For Many Ex-Cons,
Ban on Voting Can Be for Life, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at Al (quoting Ala-
bama Representative Bob McKee (R-Montgomery): "I don't care if they're His-
panic, black, white or whatever-I just take a dim view of anyone who breaks
the law."); Bush, supra note 65 (expressing similar sentiments). Clegg recently
commented that:
[W]hat the NAACP should be doing, rather than complaining about
the fact that a disproportionate number of criminals are African-
Americans, is that they ought to be figuring out what can we do to
keep such a high proportion of African American kids, particularly
African-American young men from getting involved in crime.
Whose Vote Counts? (American RadioWorks broadcast, Nov. 2003), available at
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/voting/transcript.html.
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by itself is not enough to establish an equal protection viola-
tion.8 3 Again, this argument focuses on individual choice to
commit crime, noting that the laws apply equally to all people
convicted of a felony, regardless of race.
Given the well-documented history of majority groups
seeking to deny the right to vote to particular minority groups
in the United States, however, it is not implausible to suspect
that felon disfranchisement laws may similarly find their roots
in this history, thus supplying a causal connection to the cur-
rent disparate impact. The connection between felon disfran-
chisement and race is strong. The first wave of changes in felon
disfranchisement laws occurred soon after the Civil War, corre-
sponding with the extension of voting rights to minority groups
in the Constitution,8 4 and much of the discourse of the era evi-
dences the clear and conscious intent to disfranchise minorities
in this manner.8 5 Recent research indicates that the racial
composition of state prisons was a strong predictor of states
passing a new or more restrictive felon disfranchisement law
between 1850 and 2002.86 Thus, race is not an issue entirely
separate from felon disfranchisement.
While the contemporary era may lack the same open and
public acceptance of the racial motives and discourse of the
83. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate im-
pact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.").
84. Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 563.
85. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867-68 (Miss. 1896); see, e.g., JOURNAL OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA 9-12 (Brown Printing Co. 1901). The president of Alabama's 1901
convention began the convention by urging the delegates to "establish white
supremacy" and subvert "the menace of negro domination" through "manipu-
lation of the ballot." Id. The convention later broadened its disfranchisement
law to encompass anyone who committed a crime of "moral turpitude." Id. at
1201-02. The proponent of the new law speculated, "the crime of wife-beating
alone would disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes." Shapiro, supra note 81,
at 541 (citing JIMMIE F. GROSS, ALABAMA POLITICS AND THE NEGRO, 1874-
1901, at 244 (1969)); see also id. at 537 & n.2 (citing 2 REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF
VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) (quoting a Virginia Delegate who proclaimed, "Discrimi-
nation! [T]hat, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for ... with a view
to the elimination of every negro voter.")).
86. See generally Behrens et al., supra note 34. Using an event-history
analysis, this research tracked state changes to felon disfranchisement laws
and found a consistent and significant positive effect of the proportion of non-
white inmates in a state prison on passage of a more restrictive felon disfran-
chisement law, net of region, state punitiveness, economic competition, politi-
cal power, and time. Id. at 583-91.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a racial undertone
remains in relation to felon disfranchisement laws. Although a
disparate impact is traditionally insufficient to establish dis-
crimination based on race, case law and statutory history again
reinforce the importance of the right to vote. Between the pas-
sage of the Fifteenth Amendment and the 1982 amendment to
the Voting Rights Act there was an important, albeit slow,
movement to assure equal access to the ballot, such that the
Voting Rights Act now incorporates a totality of the circum-
stances approach in which a disparate impact is a factor.8 7
While a disparate impact may not be dispositive, it is not ir-
relevant.
D. CHALLENGING FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT IN COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES
Questions about felon disfranchisement have gone beyond
academic debate. Members of the disfranchised population
have challenged the legality of their status on numerous
grounds in courts and many groups have pushed for change by
state legislatures. While a flurry of litigation and legislative
change emerged in the 1960s and 1970s,8 8 comparably little
movement occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years,
however, courts and legislatures have again been asked repeat-
edly to reexamine the question of felon disfranchisement.8 9
87. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991) (explaining that
section 2 allows challenges to voting laws where "under the totality of the cir-
cumstances.., members of the protected class have less opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process").
88. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding the
constitutionality of felon disfranchisement); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d
1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding Texas's felon disfranchisement law);
Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967) (upholding New
York's law); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (uphold-
ing North Carolina's law), affd mem., 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Kronlund v. Hon-
stein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (upholding Georgia's law); Stephens
v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (holding that New Jersey's
felon disfranchisement law violated equal protection because it created "irra-
tional and inconsistent" classifications); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp.
182, 183-84 (S.D. Fla.) (upholding Florida's felon disfranchisement law), aff'd
mem., 396 U.S. 12 (1969); Emery v. State of Montana, 580 P.2d 445, 449
(Mont. 1978) (upholding Montana's law). See Behrens et al., supra note 34, at
564-66, 591, for a catalogue of legislative changes in this period. The 1960s
and 1970s marked a significant period of change as many states liberalized
their disfranchisement laws and removed bans that extended beyond comple-
tion of sentence. Id.
89. See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004), peti-
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Courts have generally upheld felon disfranchisement laws,
while some state legislatures have amended their laws.
1. The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment's
"Affirmative Sanction" of Felon Disfranchisement
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional-
ity of felon disfranchisement in 1974.90 In Richardson v. Rami-
rez, three men who had completed their sentences for felony
convictions challenged California's law that disfranchised past
completion of sentence. 9 1 The California Supreme Court
invalidated the law, holding that it did not serve the state's
claimed interest of preventing electoral fraud.92 The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed, however, and upheld the constitutional-
tion for cert. filed, 2004 WL 1752185 (U.S. July 21, 2004) (No. 04-175); Cotton
v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding Mississippi's law);
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (splitting evenly on
whether a challenge to New York's law stated a claim under the Voting Rights
Act); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586, 2004 WL 1335921, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2004) (dismissing a challenge asserting that New York's law violated
the Voting Rights Act); Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1343-44 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) (granting summary judgment to the State in a challenge to Flor-
ida's law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida,
353 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th
Cir. 2004); Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 979, 981 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that
an inmate's challenge to Illinois's law under the Fifteenth Amendment was
nonmeritorious); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997),
rev'd sub nom. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)
(reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State
of Washington), reh'g denied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 13-1597); Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556,
560 (E.D. Va.) (granting the state's motion to dismiss a challenge to Virginia's
law), affd mem., 99 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1996); McLaughlin v. City of Canton,
947 F. Supp. 954, 976 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that Mississippi could not dis-
franchise for a misdemeanor conviction); Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321,
330 (N.H. 2000) (reversing the lower court and disfranchising New Hampshire
inmates); Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (holding the Pennsylvania Voting Rights Act of 1995 unconstitutional as
applied to persons who have completed their sentences), aff'd mem., 783 A.2d
763 (Pa. 2001).
90. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). While Ramirez marked the
first time the Court addressed felon disfranchisement as a whole, it previously
upheld disfranchisement for polygamy. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348
(1890), Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1885), Beacham v. Braterman,
300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), affd mem., 396 U.S. 12 (1969) (upholding
disfranchisement past completion of sentence in Florida).
91. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 30-32 (1974).
92. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1351-56 (Cal. 1973) (holding that
the law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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ity of the law. The Court looked to the text of Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 93 which reads, in pertinent part:
[W]hen the right to vote at any election.., is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for par-
ticipation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-
one years of age in such State.94
The Court pointed to the language "or other crime" and
concluded that disfranchisement "has an affirmative sanction"
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 The Court held that restric-
tions on the right to vote in this context therefore do not merit
the same strict scrutiny standard of review as other restrictions
on the right to vote receive. 96
Although the Court upheld the practice of felon disfran-
chisement, it carved out an exception a decade later. In Hunter
v. Underwood, the Court held that disfranchisement is uncon-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment if based upon an
intent to racially discriminate.97 The plaintiffs in Hunter chal-
lenged Alabama's disfranchisement law, which was revised at
the state's 1901 constitutional convention to include any crime
of "moral turpitude."9 8 Participants at the all-white convention
evidenced a clear intent to reduce the voting power of African
Americans, and the disfranchisement law was one of these ma-
nipulations, 99 thus offering proof of an unambiguous discrimi-
natory intent.
Intent of discrimination is difficult to prove, and few re-
cords provide a case as clear as Alabama in 1901. Even when a
claim based upon racial intent is successful, however, the vic-
tory is somewhat limited. The Hunter decision, for example, did
not invalidate Alabama's felon disfranchisement law as a
whole, and the state continues to disfranchise beyond comple-
93. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
95. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54. See infra notes 135-141 and accompanying
text for challenges to the Court's interpretation of Section Two.
96. Id. at 55; cf. supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
high judicial protection of the right to vote).
97. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
98. Id. at 223-24. See supra note 85 for a discussion of the context in
which the state altered its disfranchisement law.
99. See supra note 85.
2004] 249
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion of sentence. 100
2. Post-Ramirez Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement
Challenges to felon disfranchisement laws have been
rooted in a multitude of constitutional grounds. The most re-
curring challenges allege violations of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, 10 1 as well as section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. 102 More than one-third of states have faced a challenge to
100. ALA. CODE § 17-3-9 (2002). Hunter only had the effect of invalidating
the new "moral turpitude" aspect of disfranchisement passed in 1901, where
there was clear evidence of a discriminatory motive. Upon application for res-
toration of rights, applicants must submit to a full investigation and hearing
held by the State Board of Pardon and Paroles. David White, Riley Rejects
Felon Voting Bill, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 25, 2003, at IA; see also NKECHI
TAIFA, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT! A GUIDE FOR
INDIVIDUAL RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN STATES THAT PERMANENTLY
DISENFRANCHISE FORMER FELONS 30 (2002). Additionally, some applicants
must provide a DNA sample. ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (2002). The whole process
may take as long as two years and understaffing problems have exacerbated
the timeframe. White, supra. When one applicant tried to procure a DNA
sample, he reported being told that the state operated only four locations, one
of which ran tests only one hour per month. Katz, supra note 82. Alabama's
governor recently signed a bill to streamline the restoration process, but resto-
ration is still not automatic. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 2.
101. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed. Appx. 199, 201 (10th Cir.
2002); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); Baker v. Pataki, 85
F.3d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir.
1986); Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287,
1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004);
Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 979, 980 (C.D. Ill. 1998). For a challenge brought
under a state constitution, see NAACP v. Harvey, UNN-C-4-04 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. June 30, 2004) (letter opinion on file with author). To a lesser extent,
plaintiffs have asserted that disfranchisement violates the First, Eighth, and
Twenty-fourth Amendments. For a challenge under the First Amendment, see,
for example Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (arguing that losing the right to
vote impedes on free speech). See also Winkler, supra note 49, at 334-40, for a
discussion of voting as a form of political speech. For claims under the Eighth
Amendment, see Woodruff, 49 Fed. Appx. at 201 (arguing that disfranchise-
ment is cruel and unusual punishment); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp.
1304, 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1997) (discussing the same); McLaughlin v. City of
Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 961 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (arguing that disfranchise-
ment for conviction of a misdemeanor is cruel and unusual punishment). See
generally Thompson, supra note 71 (arguing that felon disfranchisement vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment). For a challenge under the Twenty-fourth
Amendment, see Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (likening the restoration
process to a poll tax), and Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision). See also J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfran-
chisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 435 (2001).
102. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g
denied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 24,
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their disfranchisement laws at some point. 103 Despite the
breadth of these challenges, few have been successful, 104 and no
court has completely abolished a state's practice of disfranchis-
ing for a felony conviction. Courts have adhered rather rigidly
to the Ramirez decision, and its precedent has thus far re-
mained untouched. For equal protection challenges, courts rely
on Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and Ramirez
rather than analyzing felon disfranchisement under the strict
scrutiny standard traditionally applied in cases concerning a
fundamental right. 105
a. Challenging Felon Disfranchisement Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
While the challenge in Ramirez was not based on race,
challenges under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have been
equally unsuccessful, although courts have varied on whether,
and how, the Act should apply.
In Wesley v. Collins, the first challenge under the Act's
1982 amendment, the Sixth Circuit implicitly held that the
Voting Rights Act applies to felon disfranchisement, but still
held that, despite its disparate racial impact, Tennessee's law
did not violate the Act.' 0 6 The court held that a section 2 total-
ity of the circumstances analysis required proof of a causal
2004) (No. 13-1597); Baker, 85 F.3d at 920; Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257; Johnson,
214 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
103. These states are Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See su-
pra notes 88-89, 101.
104. Among the successful challenges to felon disfranchisement laws are
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding disfranchisement un-
constitutional if based on an intent to discriminate racially); Farrakhan, 338
F.3d at 1020 (reversing the district court's summary judgment for the State of
Washington); McLaughlin, 947 F. Supp. at 973 (holding that disfranchisement
for a misdemeanor violates equal protection); Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F.
Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (holding New Jersey's law violated equal pro-
tection); and Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (precluding Pennsylvania from disfranchising beyond sentence only
those who were not registered to vote prior to incarceration), af'd mem. 783
A.2d 763 (Pa. 2001). See also supra notes 88-89 for a catalogue of decisions.
105. See McLaughlin, 947 F. Supp. at 975, for a rare exception. Because
the law at issue in McLaughlin disfranchised based on a misdemeanor convic-
tion (instead of a felony), the court held that a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view was appropriate. Id. Analyzing Section Two of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the court held that the language, "or other crime" applied only to
felonies, and thus Ramirez did not control the decision. Id.
106. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986).
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connection between race and disfranchisement, and no such re-
lationship was evident.10 7
A decade later, in Baker v. Pataki, plaintiffs challenged
New York's disfranchisement law, arguing that its disparate
impact on African Americans and Latinos violated the Voting
Rights Act. 108 The Second Circuit, en banc, split evenly on
whether the Act provides a cause of action for challenges to
felon disfranchisement. 10 9 Half of the panel believed that Con-
gress did not "unmistakably" intend for the 1982 amendment to
the Act to apply in the context of felon disfranchisement, 110
while the other half disagreed. More recently, in April 2004, the
Second Circuit held that the Voting Rights Act does not apply
to felon disfranchisement laws."'
i. The Voting Rights Act and the "Totality of the
Circumstances"
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit gave credence to the oft-rejected
challenge under the Voting Rights Act, a decision that may
provide impetus for change in future court decisions. In Farra-
khan v. Washington, the plaintiffs claimed that Washington's
disfranchisement beyond completion of sentence constituted
denial of the right to vote based on race. 112 Because of racial
disparities within the state's criminal justice system, 113 the
complaint asserted that the totality of the circumstances relat-
ing to felon disfranchisement in Washington effectively violated
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.114
While the district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the State,115 the Ninth Circuit reversed. 116 The district
107. Id. at 1262 ("[Ihe disproportionate impact suffered... does not 're-
sult' from the state's qualification... and thus the Tennessee Act does not vio-
late the Voting Rights Act.")
108. 85 F.3d 919 (2d. Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 921.
110. Id. at 922.
111. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for
cert. filed, 2004 WL 1752185 (U.S. July 21, 2004) (No. 04-175).
112. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g
denied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 24,
2004) (No. 13-1597).
113. Id. ("Plaintiffs presented statistical evidence of the [racial] disparities
in arrest, bail and pre-trial release rates, charging decisions, and sentencing
outcomes in certain aspects of Washington's criminal justice system.").
114. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1011.
115. Farrakhan v. Locke, No. CS-96-76-RHW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2000).
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court acknowledged the petitioners' compelling evidence of a
racial bias within the state's criminal justice system, but fo-
cused on disfranchisement in isolation, noting that the law ap-
plied equally to all convicted of a felony without regard to race
and was not by itself discriminatory. 117 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the results-based standard of the Act necessitates con-
sideration of "how a challenged voting practice interacts with
external factors such as 'social and historical conditions' to re-
sult in denial of the right to vote on account of race or color."
118
The district court therefore erred in excluding racial disparity
in the criminal justice system from its analysis under the Vot-
ing Rights Act.119
In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit appears to
have opened a door that previous courts have closed with re-
gard to challenges under the Voting Rights Act. Because the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that courts must consider social
and historical conditions in relation to felon disfranchisement
laws, the disparate impact of these laws takes on new impor-
tance. Given the historical origins of felon disfranchisement in
the United States, the substantial growth of the practice follow-
ing the legal enfranchisement of all citizens, 120 and the exis-
tence of widespread biases within state criminal justice sys-
tems,' 2 1 the Ninth Circuit's approach creates a new and
important route for challenges to disfranchisement laws under
the Voting Rights Act.
In a challenge to Florida's disfranchisement law, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Ninth
Circuit. 122 The court recently vacated that decision, however,
116. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1009.
117. Farrakhan, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at *9-10, *14. The court
noted that "[a]t most, [evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice sys-
tem] establishes a flaw with the criminal justice system, not with the disfran-
chisement provision." Id. at *10.
118. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1011-12 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
119. Id. at 1012.
120. See supra notes 37-44, 84-86 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
122. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), va-
cated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004). In applying the Act, the dis-
trict court had looked to Wesley for guidance and agreed that "there must be a
nexus between the discriminatory exclusion of blacks.., and the disfran-
chisement of felons." Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1341 (S.D. Fla.
2002) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353
F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.
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and the case will soon be reconsidered by the court en banc. 123
3. Recent Legislative Changes to State Felon
Disfranchisement Laws
While legal challenges to felon disfranchisement have
rarely been successful, some state legislatures have amended
their disfranchisement laws. Within the past nine years, eight
states have altered their laws in ways that will theoretically fa-
cilitate restoration of voting rights. 124 For example, Connecticut
enfranchised probationers and Delaware, Maryland, and Wyo-
ming amended their laws to eliminate indefinite disfranchise-
ment for some classes of felons. 125 Nevada eased its process for
both first-time offenders and recidivists, New Mexico and Texas
now restore voting rights upon completion of sentence, and Vir-
ginia eased some barriers in its restoration process. 126
Not all quests for reform in this area, however, have been
successful or easily attained. In 2003, Alabama legislators
reached a compromise to restore voting rights upon completion
of sentence, but Governor Bob Riley pocket-vetoed the bill,
sparking protests.1 27 In 2002, a bill to restore voting rights to
felons for federal elections failed in the U.S. Senate. 128 Simi-
2004). Moreover, the court stated that any disparate impact resulting from ra-
cism in the state's criminal justice system "is irrelevant to the voting rights
challenge." Id. at 1341-42. The Eleventh Circuit panel held that the court
erred by failing to consider how felon disfranchisement laws interacted with
social and historical circumstances. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1305.
123. Johnson, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (vacating the
panel's decision).
124. STEVEN KALOGERAS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES ON FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 1996-2003, at 1 (Marc Mauer ed.
2003) available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/legchangesreport.pdf.
The use of "theoretically" acknowledges that while some states may change
their processes of restoring rights, the changes may not necessarily enfran-
chise more people. For example, elimination of a waiting period to apply for
restoration may have little impact if the rest of the restoration process re-
mains intact. Further, even though states draw more lines between violent
and non-violent felonies, they still have the power to redefine crime and en-
compass more offenses under the umbrella of "violent." See supra note 56.
125. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 1.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Jannell McGrew, Protesters Brave Heat to Criticize Governor,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July 19, 2003, at Al; White, supra note 100. The
governor later signed a different bill intended to streamline the restoration
process. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 2.
128. H.R. 5510, 107th Cong. (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S565 (daily ed. Feb.
14, 2002). Two similar bills have been reintroduced in Congress. H.R. 259,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1433; loath Cong. (2003).
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larly, a handful of states have adopted, or attempted to adopt,
more restrictive felon disfranchisement laws in recent years.
Kansas, for example, disfranchised probationers in 2002 and
Utah and Massachusetts recently disfranchised prison in-
mates. 129 Legislators in South Carolina sought, but failed, to
change its law to remove voting rights for fifteen years after
completion of sentence; the state presently restores voting
rights upon completion of sentence. 130
II. RECONCILING VOTING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
AND FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
In light of voting's status as a fundamental right and the
increasing protection that right has received, felon disfran-
chisement laws stand as a large exception. An examination of
the history and development of felon disfranchisement laws in
the United States, the debates over the laws, and the treatment
they receive from courts and legislatures indicates that voting
is not quite the fundamental right that many take for granted.
How have felon disfranchisement laws survived? This question
inevitably raises several other issues, including how courts
evaluate these restrictive laws, how they should evaluate them,
and how the same arguments fare in front of judicial and legis-
lative decisionmakers.
A. EVALUATING FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS AS AN
INFRINGEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that re-
strictions on the right to vote are subject to a strict scrutiny
standard of review,13 1 the Court exempted felon disfranchise-
ment laws from such review in Richardson v. Ramirez.132 Thus,
129. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 1. The change in Kansas stemmed
from state legislative action, while the amendments in Utah and Massachu-
setts were constitutional amendments approved by the state electorate. Id. at
3, 4-5.
130. Warren Wise, Criminal Example Upsets Lawmakers, POST &
COURIER, Feb. 15, 2001, at BI [hereinafter Wise, Criminal Example]; Warren
Wise, House Doesn't Kill Bill to Delay Felons Voting, POST & COURIER, Feb.
16, 2001, at A3 [hereinafter Wise, House Doesn't Kill Bill].
131. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
132. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). The Court held that
the plain language in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment "is of control-
ling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations
on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause by this Court." Id. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text for a
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few decisions since Ramirez have given the issue a meaningful
analysis beyond citing to Ramirez and recognizing the narrow
exception in Hunter v. Underwood.13 3 The Ramirez Court's in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been
subject to criticism for its "unsound historical analysis."134
The Court took the text of Section Two on its face, arguing
that it remained in force, as a qualification to Section One, and
supported disfranchisement. 135 Although the Court insisted the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment was not important, 136
the context in which it arose and subsequent interpretations
yielded a different conclusion. 137 Section Two addressed states
seeking re-admission to the Union following the Civil War and
sought to penalize-by reducing congressional representation-
states that continued to deny the right to vote to African
Americans. 138 A joint committee added the Section Two lan-
discussion of Ramirez and Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
also Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he right of convicted
felons to vote is not 'fundamental."').
133. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed. Appx. 199, 203 (10th Cir.
2002); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Bush,
214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003),
vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004). See supra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222
(1985) (holding unconstitutional felon disfranchisement based upon a racially
discriminatory intent).
134. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-16 (2d ed. 1988) (calling the
Ramirez Court's interpretation "fundamentally misconceived"); Fletcher, su-
pra note 48, at 1900-02.
135. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55.
136. Id. at 54.
137. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right"
to Vote and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 33, 43-44. Van Alstyne discusses the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment, noting that Sections One and Two were originally two
separate constitutional amendments and that Section Two "was designed pri-
marily to meet a particular, separable, and immediate problem of protecting
the Republican hegemony in Congress." Id.
138. JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND
THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 123 (1997) (pointing to
the dilemma Section Two put to Southern states: "give blacks the vote (an un-
thinkable choice) or lose representation in Congress (an unacceptable
choice)"); see also Fletcher, supra note 48, at 1901 (discussing the "paradox of
disenfranchisement," and noting that "a constitutional provision designed in
1868 to improve the political representation of blacks has turned out.., to
have precisely the opposite effect").
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guage "or other crime" without explanation, 139 and there is no
affirmative evidence that this language was to have meaning
outside the context of the section. 140 Further, history indicates
that Section Two's threat of reduced representation was never
enforced.1 41 Thus, while the plain text of Section Two may at
first appear to sanction felon disfranchisement, a closer look at
the context of the Section reveals that it had a limited histori-
cal purpose and the phrase "or other crime" should not be in-
terpreted in this manner.
The Ramirez Court also gave weight to the fact that some
states disfranchised for crimes at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 142 This observation is unremarkable, however, be-
cause the Court has rendered unconstitutional multiple limita-
tions on suffrage that were in effect at that time. 143 Similarly,
139. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 746-47 n.158.
140. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Section 2 provides
a special remedy-reduced representation-to cure a particular form of elec-
toral abuse-the disfranchisement of Negroes.").
Prior to Ramirez, the Second Circuit upheld felon disfranchisement, also
relying on Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. Green v. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967). Itzkowitz and Oldak attacked this ba-
sis, arguing that:
[Section Two's] crucial words 'or other crimes' are utterly devoid of
independent legislative intent, and take on historical meaning only as
part of the phrase 'participation in rebellion, or other crime.' It is
clear that the thrust of this language was to limit governmental activ-
ity by former rebels .... There is no apparent legislative intent for
this addition [of 'or other crimes'], and it make sense only as giving
states a broader weapon to use against former Confederates.
Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 746 n.158 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and
the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 591
n.26 (2001) ("Despite its sweeping language, Section 2 turned out to be tooth-
less because neither Congress nor the courts ever showed themselves willing
to pull the trigger.").
142. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 48. The Court noted that since states were re-
admitted to the Union with these provisions in place, Congress affirmatively
approved of criminal disfranchisement. Id. at 48-49.
143. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) (prohibiting
durational residency requirements); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 668 (1966) (striking down poll taxes). Interestingly, the Ramirez majority
cites dicta in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
51 (1959) (upholding literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting) as support for
its holding, Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 53, when section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 clearly overruled the Lassiter decision just six years later. Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 4 79 Stat. 438-39 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973b (2000)) (prohibiting the use of "tests" or "devices" specifically
requiring voters to "demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or in-
terpret any matter [or] demonstrate any educational achievement or his
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conceptions of who should be able to vote have changed in im-
portant ways since 1868. Section Two allowed states to deny
the right to vote based on race, albeit with a penalty, but two
years later the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly eliminated that
choice, thus rendering Section Two inoperative. 144 Section Two
also excluded from penalty states that disfranchised women
and those less than twenty-one years of age. 145 As the Court
has noted, "[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions
of equality."'146
Because none of the text within Section Two remains cur-
rent, courts should analyze felon disfranchisement laws as any
other restriction on the right to vote-an infringement of a fun-
damental right. This perspective triggers a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review, under which a state may disfranchise for a fel-
ony conviction only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.147 Further, courts examining race-
based challenges to felon disfranchisement should use a
broader conception of the totality of the circumstances standard
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as articulated by the
Ninth Circuit in Farrakhan v. Washington.148 When analyzing
the laws within the framework of voting as a fundamental right
and acknowledging the connection between race and
disfranchisement, it becomes clear that felon disfranchisement
laws cannot withstand such scrutiny.
knowledge of any particular subject"); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 658 (1966) (upholding section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act and striking
down New York's requirement that voters be able to read and write English).
In his dissent, Justice Marshall also pointed to Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), in which the Court permitted Congress to lower the voting
age in federal elections to eighteen, despite the language in Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 98 (1908) (noting that Section Two "has never had any effect
whatever [sic] since it became a part of the fundamental law of the land....
due . . . to the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment practically superceded it, or,
as some have said, nullified it"); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to
Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment,
46 CORNELL L.Q. 108 (1960); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction and the Right to
Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth?, 92
GEO. L.J. 259 (2004).
145. These options were eliminated by the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth
Amendments, respectively. U.S. CONST. amends. XIX and XXVI.
146. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
147. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 11-14, 76--81 and accompanying text.
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1. Felon Disfranchisement Laws Fail Review under Strict
Scrutiny and the Voting Rights Act
Two reasons should bring felon disfranchisement chal-
lenges under a stricter standard of review. First, the challenges
concern the general, fundamental right to vote, and second,
many of the claims allege vote denial or dilution based on
race.149 Under either approach, the laws fail to withstand re-
view. Even assuming states have legitimate, or perhaps com-
pelling, state interests with respect to regulating suffrage
qualifications, the means by which felon disfranchisement laws
serve those interests are overinclusive and only tenuously re-
lated. Courts should therefore add felon disfranchisement to
the catalogue of restrictions that states may no longer impose
on the right to vote.
a. Limitations of the Argument for Disfranchising Based on a
Felony Conviction
As the Warren Court elevated the right to vote to the
status of a fundamental right in the 1960s, 150 the Court repeat-
edly alluded to why the right merits so much protection. In
short, voting preserves all other rights and is central to the no-
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2002),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d
1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.
2004); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997), rev'd sub
nom. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g de-
nied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 24,
2004) (No. 13-1597); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn.
1985), affld, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). Voter denial refers to the individu-
als disfranchised, while voter dilution refers to the diminished voting strength
of minority communities. See Shapiro, supra note 81, at 555-60 (arguing that
challengers to disfranchisement laws have "good reasons to allege both vote
denial and vote dilution, and to do so in separate counts").
Several have challenged the distinctions between which classes of persons
a law disfranchises. See, e.g., Owen v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 25-26 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding there was no equal protection violation for treating incarcer-
ated and unincarcerated persons differently); Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759
A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (upholding differential disfranchisement
of incarcerated and unincarcerated persons, but finding no rational basis for
treating those who had completed their sentences differently based on being a
registered voter prior to incarceration); see also Jill E. Simmons, Comment,
Beggars Can't Be Voters: Why Washington's Felon Re-Enfranchisement Law
Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 78 WASH. L. REV. 297 (2003) (arguing
that requiring a fee to apply for restoration of voting rights unconstitutionally
distinguishes between similarly-situated persons based on wealth).
150. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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tion of a democracy; without equal access to the ballot, the gov-
ernment is not one of the people, but rather one selected by an
elite group deemed "worthy" enough to vote. 15 1 The Court has
not, however, contended that states have no interests with re-
gard to regulating elections. States typically argue that they
have an interest in preventing electoral fraud,152 maintaining
the "purity" or integrity of the ballot box, 153 restricting the
franchise to those who support or have an interest in the state
itself,1 54 and deterring future crime. 15 5 The Court has acknowl-
edged the validity of some of these goals in relation to the right
to vote,1 56 but has generally found that states use these "formi-
dable-sounding" interests as a guise to implement impermissi-
ble restrictions on the right to vote. 157 Yet states advance these
same interests in support of felon disfranchisement and courts
have validated them. 158 Such rationales, however, do not sup-
port these claimed interests in a manner superior to those
means previously struck down.
i. Felon Disfranchisement Laws Do Not Prevent
Electoral Fraud
While a state may claim that felon disfranchisement pre-
vents electoral fraud, the total number of election-related
151. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing
that the right to vote is central to a representative government).
152. See generally Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1973) (discussing
California's stated purpose in relation to the historical use of voting restric-
tions claimed to prevent electoral fraud), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Rami-
rez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
153. See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
154. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir.
1967), cited with approval in Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed. Appx. 199, 203
(10th Cir. 2002); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 930 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley, 605
F. Supp. at 813; Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321, 329-30 (N.H. 2000).
155. See, e.g., Baker, 85 F.3d at 930; Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
156. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
231 (1989) ("A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of its election process.") (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752,
761 (1973)); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972) ("Surely the preven-
tion of ... fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal.").
157. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345; see also, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 631-32 (1969) (holding that despite New York's interest in limit-
ing school district elections to "interested" parties who are "directly affected,"
its law was not narrowly-tailored to serve that interest).
158. See supra notes 154-155.
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crimes is negligible, and arguments regarding fraud are much
more rhetorical than factual. 159 Previous commission of a felony
does not logically lead to future commission of electoral fraud,
nor does previous non-commission of a felony rule out the pos-
sibility of future electoral fraud; 160 one has no bearing on the
other. When states have asserted electoral fraud in other con-
texts, the Court has held that speculative fears are not enough
to support infringing upon a constitutional right. 161 Further,
states have other workable means to prevent fraud. 62 Thus,
disfranchisement for any felony conviction is not a narrowly-
tailored route to achieve states' interests in preventing election
fraud.
ii. Felon Disfranchisement Laws Do Not Protect the
"Purity" of the Ballot Box
As a variation on the claimed interest of preventing elec-
toral fraud, states have proposed an interest in preserving the
"purity" of the ballot box. This argument takes several forms,
generally focusing on either the overall integrity of the ballot or
on a violation of the social contract. The "purity" aspect of the
argument is particularly dangerous given the historical turns
such a theory has followed. Historically, the same rationale was
advanced for other exclusionary practices, such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and long residency requirements. States claimed
that poll taxes ensured that only truly interested parties
159. MINNITE & CALLAHAN, supra note 71, at 14 (commenting that "[w]hile
the issue of fraud is raised continually in discussion of election reform, to date
there have been no major studies of election fraud in the United
States"(emphasis omitted)). Minnite and Callahan conclude that "[o]verall, the
disenfranchisement of voters through antiquated voting systems, errors, mis-
management of registration bases, and intimidation or harassment is a far
bigger problem today than traditional forms of election fraud." Id. at 15. Their
study covered twelve states and led to the conclusion that "[e]lection fraud ap-
pears to be very rare." Id. at 17.
160. Thompson, supra note 71, at 194. Noting that anyone is capable of
committing an election offense, regardless of a prior felony conviction or past
voting behavior, Thompson comments, "possession of the right to vote is not
required to commit the majority of election offenses." Id.
161. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S.
182, 210 (1999) (invalidating criteria for petition circulation).
162. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 353 (noting that Tennessee punished elec-
tion fraud in numerous ways, and thus the state's residency requirement was
not narrowly tailored to this interest); see also Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d
1345, 1351 (Cal. 1973) (discussing Dunn with approval and applying the same
logic to felon disfranchisement), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974).
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voted, 163 and that literacy tests and residency requirements en-
sured "intelligent use of the ballot."164 The Court has invali-
dated all of these requirements. Therefore, invoking identical
rationales in support of felon disfranchisement laws16 5 should
be suspect on similar grounds. While it is often argued that
"purity" or integrity prevents fraud, the idea is vague and in-
herently signals that some groups are more worthy of the right
to vote than others. As a matter of democratic principal, one
should be wary of assigning worth to members of the elector-
ate. 16
6
Rhetorically, it is easy to paint a vivid picture of "rapists,
murders, and robbers"167 "corrupting" the ballot box. Behind
these statements, however, lie many facts that cut against such
broad disfranchisement for all felony convictions. First, persons
convicted of the above-listed crimes comprise less than one-
third of those in prison; 68 thus, the imagery of most people
with felony convictions as a violent group does not match real-
ity. Second, laws that disfranchise millions to punish such a
small group are hardly narrowly-tailored. Although commission
of a crime may potentially signal a questionable character, de-
163. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676-77 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
164. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959); accord Dunn, 405 U.S. at 360.
165. See, e.g., Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986); Shepherd v.
Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1978); Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445
(2d Cir. 1967).
166. For this same reason, states are no better-off when they make distinc-
tions in disfranchising differently based on classification of a crime as violent
or non-violent, or recidivism. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ELECTION LAW § 3-
102(b) (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 213.157 (Michie 2003); see also ELY, supra
note 151, at 120 ("We cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out, and it is
therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the
vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason ... it had better be a
very convincing one.").
167. 148 CONG. REC. S802 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen.
McConnell). In a debate over whether to enfranchise all who had completed
their sentences in federal elections, Senator Mitchell McConnell (R-Ky.) ar-
gued against the measure, commenting:
We are talking about rapists, murderers, robbers, and even terrorists
or spies. Do we want to see convicted terrorists who seek to destroy
this country voting in elections? Do we want to see convicted spies
who cause great damage to this country voting in elections? Do we
want to see "jailhouse blocs" banding together to oust sheriffs and
government officials who are tough on crime?
Id.
168. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2001, at 499 (2002).
FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
nying suffrage as a consequence should not be a valid option.
iii. Felon Disfranchisement Laws Do Not Protect a
State's Interests
Another frequent claim by proponents of disfranchisement
is that it protects the overall state and country from those who
would otherwise vote in destructive ways. 169 The claim of pro-
tecting the state from "subversive" voters fails as related to
felon disfranchisement. The general assumption that commis-
sion of a crime indicates a desire to subvert the state is flawed.
Persons with a felony conviction are subject to the same laws
and control as the rest of the voting-age population, perhaps
more so. Decisions made by elected officials continue to affect
their lives and families in myriad ways; to pretend otherwise is
disingenuous. 170
A felony conviction is not dispositive of one's political
views. It is unlikely that crime policy is the sole reason that a
voter supports a given candidate, nor does a conviction neces-
sarily indicate a person's view regarding crime itself. That he
or she will vote a straight "pro-crime" ticket is unlikely, 171 as is
the chance that such candidates would win and subsequently
sway enough legislators to change the law. 172 Further, were
that situation to unfold, it would be the product of the larger
democratic process, not that of people with felony convictions
corrupting the ballot box or subverting state interests. The ar-
gument also presupposes that no crime-related policy is in need
of change.
That criminal activity is the only widespread restriction on
suffrage deemed worthy of disfranchisement is curious. Crime
is not the only issue of interest in the country, and thus a fel-
ony conviction should not be considered the only act substantial
enough to justify stripping away the right to vote. Further, the
malleability of the term "felony" and what it encompasses
should suggest that there is nothing inherent in criminal activ-
ity to justify losing the right to vote; two people committing the
same act a few years apart in the same state may face drasti-
169. See, e.g., supra note 167 (comments of Sen. McConnell).
170. See supra note 157.
171. See, e.g., Lucia Benaquisto & Peter J. Freed, The Myth of Inmate Law-
lessness: The Perceived Contradiction Between Self and Other in Inmates' Sup-
port for Criminal Justice Sanctioning Norms, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 481, 505
(1996).
172. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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cally different consequences if a legislature reclassifies an of-
fense. Moreover, for two similarly-situated people in different
states, the consequences may differ vastly. Differences in state
disfranchisement laws also produce seeming inequity: someone
convicted of drug possession in Florida indefinitely loses the
right to vote while someone convicted of first-degree murder in
Vermont never loses the right to vote.
If states cannot trust persons convicted of a crime to vote
in the public interest, perhaps those found liable in civil suits
also will not vote in the interest of society. Tort liability, for ex-
ample, may signal poor decision making, as could filing for
bankruptcy or accumulating debt. Those with traffic tickets
have disobeyed the law, and according to one official even that
should bear on the right to vote. 173 A felony-level crime admit-
tedly differs in severity from a traffic ticket or a civil judgment,
but its relationship to suffrage remains as tenuous and illogical
as the above examples.
As for the argument that criminal activity evidences a dis-
interest in the state, it is important to note the consistently low
voter turnout by all eligible voters. 174 Any purported apathy
toward states and government is not limited to persons with
felony convictions. The blanket exclusion of this group because
some would allegedly vote subversively is speculative, overin-
clusive, and not narrowly-tailored to any compelling state in-
terest. 175 These rationales against enfranchisement do not hold
up under strict scrutiny.
Moreover, the idea that anyone might vote subversively or
for the "wrong" candidate or interest is inimical to the concept
of a democracy and representative government. The Court has
stated previously that "'[f]encing out' from the franchise a sec-
173. Thomas B. Pfankuch, Clemency Board Very Cautious in Restoring
Rights, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 3, 2001, available at http://www.jacksonville
.comltu-online/stories/060301/met_6339439.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004)
(quoting a chief cabinet aide to a board member who helps make clemency de-
cisions in Florida: "[I]t's appropriate that the board would reject an application
for something as minor as traffic tickets" because "[y]ou're breaking the law,
you're not being a law-abiding citizen.").
174. Only slightly more than half of the voting-age population cast a vote
in the 2000 presidential election. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 254 (122d ed. 2002). Elections be-
low the presidential level yielded an even lower rate of participation. Id.
175. On the other hand, disfranchising only for a felony conviction could be
viewed as underinclusive; surely persons with a felony conviction on their re-
cord are not the only group of people with ideas that others might consider
undesirable.
264 [89:231
2004] FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 265
tor of the population because of the way they may vote is con-
stitutionally impermissible."176 Although those disfranchised by
felony convictions have committed a crime at some point in
their lives, eliminating a large and growing population from
having any right to vote undermines the concept of a represen-
tative government because states can restrict the size and rep-
resentative nature of the electorate.
iv. Felon Disfranchisement Laws Do Not Serve as a
Deterrent to Future Crime
Although early disfranchisement laws were rooted in the
concepts of deterrence and retribution, 177 such rationales do not
support modern forms of felon disfranchisement. The claimed
deterrent effect of disfranchisement hinged primarily on the
public nature of the loss of rights,178 but with the formalization
of the criminal justice system and the growth of the country as
a whole, today there is not a comparable public aspect. While
the broad range of collateral consequences retains the aspect of
an internal stigma for those with a criminal conviction, their
disfranchised status lacks the same public and individualized
stigmatic attention that existed in the "small communities" of
colonial America. 179 Further, a recent study suggests that there
176. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (invalidating a provision
that prohibited members of the armed services from voting in Texas if sta-
tioned in the state). The Carrington Court further stated: "'The exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of.. . institutions,'. .. cannot constitution-
ally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group
of bona fide residents." Id. (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939)). See also Thompson, supra note 71, at 195 (noting that the exclu-
sion of "anti-social" voters mirrors historical rationales for excluding now-
protected groups from voting).
177. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
179. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 753. Itzkowitz and Oldak
comment that
[t]he notion of lasting criminal taint, which justified the ancient prac-
tices of infamy, outlawry, and civil death, is no longer a viable one in
our scheme of criminal justice. The idea of taint is not only repugnant
to current conceptions of penology but is counterproductive to the re-
habilitative ideal that underlies those conceptions. Yet the idea of
taint is essential to the doctrine of the purity of the ballot box, a doc-
trine which Green and its progeny fasten upon as the primary justifi-
cation for disenfranchisement. Flawed by its reliance on this out-
moded concept, the purity of the ballot box is an interest too feeble to
assert in support of disenfranchisement statutes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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may be a link between voting and desistance from crime,1 80
which should support the idea of enfranchising rather than dis-
franchising those convicted of crimes.
b. Reviewing Felon Disfranchisement Laws as a Violation of
the Voting Rights Act
Perhaps one of the more troubling aspects of felon disfran-
chisement laws is the disproportionate impact that the laws
have on the African American population. 8 1 Until Farrakhan
v. Washington,8 2 courts had denied race-based challenges un-
der the Voting Rights Act any meaningful analysis. In denying
these claims, courts have typically either resorted to the tradi-
tional principle that a disparate impact is not sufficient to show
unconstitutionality,1 8 3 focused only on the race-neutral text and
application of felon disfranchisement laws, 8 4 or held that a ra-
cially discriminatory intent had dissipated with the passage of
time.1 8 5
The 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act shifted from
an intent-based to a results-based standard. Under the Act, a
challenger must show that a practice related to voting creates a
disparate impact and that, viewed under a totality of the cir-
cumstances, the practice dilutes or denies the right to vote
based on race. 8 6 The 1982 amendment recognized the difficulty
of proving a discriminatory intent and further recognized the
persistence of an inadequate remedy to racially-motivated re-
180. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and
Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004). This exploratory study analyzed longitudinal survey data,
finding general support for the idea that arrestees who vote are subsequently
less likely to be re-arrested or incarcerated.
181. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
182. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir.
2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 13-1597).
183. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287,
1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004);
Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affd 791 F.2d 1255
(6th Cir. 1986).
184. See, e.g., Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Farrakhan v.
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied by 359 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 13-1597).
185. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); Johnson,
214 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; see infra note 195.
186. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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strictions on suffrage.18 7 Despite this change, courts have con-
tinued to reject felon disfranchisement challenges under the
Voting Rights Act.188
In Wesley v. Collins,18 9 the court essentially added a re-
quirement to the Act in holding that its plaintiffs failed to show
a causal connection between historical discrimination and the
present law, noting that the law did not "bear the taint of his-
torically-rooted discrimination."190 In adding this requirement,
the court nearly reverts back to the intent-based standard
found in the pre-1982 version of the Voting Rights Act. 191 The
court further stated that "[d]isenfranchising the felon never has
been attributed to discriminatory exclusion of racial minorities
from the polls."'192 District courts in Florida 193 and Missis-
sippi 194 acknowledged racist intent in the original passage of
their felon disfranchisement laws, yet found that because sub-
sequent legislatures had retained the laws, this eliminated the
discriminatory intent. 195
187. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
188. E.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004), petition
for cert. filed No. 04-175, 2004 WL 1752185 (U.S. July 21, 2004); Baker v.
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996). See generally Wesley, 605 F. Supp. 802.
189. See generally 605 F. Supp. 802.
190. Id. at 812-13.
191. See Shapiro, supra note 81, at 551-52 (discussing the Wesley court's
"misapplication" of the Voting Rights Act). Challenges under the Act prior to
the 1982 amendment required proof of a discriminatory intent. City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980); see also supra notes 10-14 and accompany-
ing text.
192. Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 813.
193. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287,
1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en bancby 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004).
194. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
195. In each of these cases, the courts held that although the initial pas-
sage of the states' respective felon disfranchisement laws may have been moti-
vated by an intent to racially discriminate, that taint had dissipated since the
laws were retained throughout substantial amendments to the states' codes
and constitutions. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391
(noting that "a "facially neutral provision.., might overcome its odious ori-
gin"). But cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An
Analysis of Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
421, 437-38 (2002) (arguing that the Cotton court "got it exactly backwards").
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i. Considering the Social and Historical Circumstances of
Felon Disfranchisement Laws Under the "Totality of the
Circumstances" Standard of the Voting Rights Act
In refusing to give challenges to felon disfranchisement
laws a thorough results-based analysis under the Voting Rights
Act that considers the totality of the circumstances, courts
again differentiate the laws from every other restriction on the
right to vote. The predominant error courts make is focusing on
the text of felon disfranchisement laws, rather than on the sur-
rounding processes that result in application of the law. Al-
though couched in race-neutral language and facially applied in
a race-neutral manner,19 6 courts must consider the interaction
between the laws and other social forces. When states have so
much control over the multiple processes leading to the confer-
ral of the label "felon," it is impossible to ignore these processes
when evaluating a law that turns solely on that conferred
status. 197
The relationship between felon disfranchisement and race
is not spurious. The goal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
its subsequent amendments was to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in voting. It became clear that the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments were insufficient when states imple-
mented other voting requirements to prevent a racially-diverse
electorate. 198 The shift to a results-based analysis with the
1982 amendment to the Act recognized that while many re-
quirements to vote were facially race-neutral, they did not op-
erate in race-neutral ways. 199 While amending the Act, the U.S.
Senate stated that "even a consistently applied practice prem-
ised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiffs
showing through other factors that the challenged practice de-
nies minorities fair access to the process." 200 Yet this statute,
196. Formal application refers to the disfranchisement of all persons con-
victed of a felony, without regard to race. Another complaint, however, arises
in states that restore voting rights only through an application and pardon
process, where voting rights may not be restored in a race-neutral manner.
See, e.g., Gary Kane & Scott Hiaasen, Clemency Process Unfair to Blacks?
PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 23, 2001, at 1A (discussing racial disparities in Flor-
ida's process for restoring rights).
197. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
198. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1966). See
supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
200. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 207 n.117 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 n.117.
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meant to enfranchise African Americans and eliminate prac-
tices with discriminatory impacts, has been used to support dis-
franchisement. 201 The growth of felon disfranchisement laws
was another product of these eras, yet these laws have some-
how escaped the same fate as poll taxes, literacy tests, and like
measures, even though they bear the same taint as other in-
validated voting qualifications.
The Farrakhan Court appears to be the first to call for a
proper application of the totality of the circumstances standard
under the Voting Rights Act as applied to felon disfranchise-
ment laws.202 In holding that courts must consider the interac-
tion of felon disfranchisement laws and external factors, includ-
ing social and historical conditions, 20 3 the Ninth Circuit gives
challenges under the Voting Rights Act their due consideration;
subsequent courts should analyze felon disfranchisement laws
under the same framework to take the further step of invalidat-
ing the laws.
B. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT
While legal challenges to felon disfranchisement have gen-
erally been unsuccessful, several state legislatures have
changed their disfranchisement provisions in recent years. Leg-
islative changes have extended the right to vote in some states,
but the laws generally do not face any less resistance than in
the courts. Debates over specific state laws generally focus on a
desire for overall fairness and a concern about the racial impact
of felon disfranchisement laws. Opponents of reform often at-
tempt to shift these debates to one of being either "tough" or
"soft" on crime, injecting a political element that is less appar-
ent in judicial decisions.20 4 As a result, most of the reforms in
recent years were the culmination of years of work to overcome
repeated rejections. 20 5 Some of these reforms, however, reflect
an increasing acceptance of arguments that courts have re-
jected.
201. See Fletcher, supra note 48, at 1900-01 (noting the "paradox" of using
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment to support felon disfranchisement).
202. See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
203. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2003),
reh'g denied by 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May
24, 2004) (No. 13-1597).
204. See infra note 228; see also Mauer, supra note 73, at 42 (commenting
on the "get tough" political culture).
205. See generally KALOGERAS, supra note 124.
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Most of the recent changes have been in states that for-
merly disfranchised those who had completed their sen-
tences.206 While Delaware amended its law to restore voting
rights automatically five years after completion of sentence, the
bill had been in a senate committee for a decade because its
chair "deeply opposed the legislation."207 In 2003, Maryland
eliminated a restriction that required recidivists to receive a
pardon before regaining voting rights, although the new law
currently requires a three-year waiting period and applies only
to non-violent crimes. 20 8 This legislation was a priority for Afri-
can American legislators and led to "an emotional debate that
pitted tough-on-crime conservatives against African American
senators who compared the current voting ban to the poll taxes
and literacy tests that silenced the voices of black Americans
for decades."209
Following the 1999 failure of a bill to enfranchise proba-
tioners in Connecticut, over forty organizations joined forces to
form the Connecticut Voting Rights Restoration Coalition. 210
After another failure in 2000, the Coalition embarked on a
"state-wide public awareness campaign," and the bill was ulti-
mately successful in 2001.211 Legislators viewed the bill as a
"democracy issue, not a 'soft on crime' issue,' 212 and the gover-
nor approved the bill because he "just thought it was fair. ' 213
206. Since 1996, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and
Wyoming successfully amended their laws that formerly disfranchised all ex-
felons to some extent. Id. Legislation to do the same in Alabama, Florida, and
Virginia failed. Id. at 1.
207. Id. at 2. Kalogeras also notes that the 2000 change had the support of
seventy-five to eighty percent of Delaware citizens. Id. This level of support is
consistent with other studies of public opinion on enfranchising felons. Jeff
Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 68 PUB. OP. Q. 275, 280-81 (2004).
208. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 3.
209. Lori Montgomery & Matthew Mosk, Md. Bill Would Let Ex-criminals
Vote, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at B5. The change in Maryland initially
would have restored voting rights upon completion of sentence, but because of
the strong opposition by Senate Republicans, the three-year waiting period
resulted as a compromise. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 3.
210. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 2.
211. Id.
212. Miles S. Rapoport, Restoring the Vote, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2001,
available at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=View
Print&articleId=5841. The Department of Adult Probation in Connecticut also
felt the new law would "help 're-root' individuals who are returning to their
communities from prison." Id.
213. Paul Zielbauer, Felons Gain Voting Rights in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES,
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New Mexico repealed parts of its disfranchisement law as a re-
sult of a strong lobbying effort and the use of research showing
the effect of felon disfranchisement on elections. 2 14 Although
one Republican admitted fearing that these newly enfranchised
people would register to vote as Democrats, he ultimately sup-
ported the bill, commenting, "Fair is fair. When people have
served their time, all of it, it's very hard for me intellectually to
say that person should not be restored to full citizenship.
'215
Legislatures across the country have thus responded to
calls for reform of felon disfranchisement laws in different ways
than courts. Rather than using a social contract theory to sup-
port disfranchisement, legislatures focus on reintegration into
society and basic conceptions of fairness. Completing a sentence
imposed for a criminal act appears to be a sufficient remedy to
any previous breach of the social contract. 216 This argument
continues to limit re-enfranchisement, however, because, with
the exception of Connecticut, all of the recent changes have
only affected the voting rights of those who have completed
sentences, not the disfranchised population as a whole.
Similar to most courts, some legislators seem reluctant to
acknowledge that laws phrased in race-neutral ways are not
necessarily race-neutral. 2 17 Although the Maryland legislature
seemed to accept arguments about racial impacts, recent de-
bates in Alabama and South Carolina illustrate otherwise.
Race was at the forefront of debates in these states when legis-
lators unsuccessfully sought to restrict and expand, respec-
tively, application of their states' felon disfranchisement law.218
May 15, 2001, at B5 (quoting the governor's press secretary).
214. KALOGERAS, supra note 124, at 5; see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
215. Donovan Kabalka, Felons Might Be Able to Vote Again, ALBUQUERQUE
TRIB., June 29, 2001, at A2 (quoting New Mexico State Republican Party
Chairman John Dendahl).
216. While some states have been receptive to this argument, Congress has
not. Since 1999, two bills entitled The Civic Participation and Rehabilitation
Act have failed. These measures would have restored the right to vote to all
unincarcerated people with a felony conviction in federal elections. See H.R.
5510, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). In January 2003,
Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.), sponsor of the previous two bills,
again reintroduced The Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2003.
H.R. 259, 108th Cong. (2003). See also H.R. 1433, 108th Cong. (2003) (seeking
to restore the right to vote to all who have completed their sentence in federal
elections as part of The Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2003).
217. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
218. See White, supra note 100 (discussing Alabama's experience with dis-
franchisement).
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In response to the governor's veto of a re-enfranchisement law,
one Alabama senator commented, "It's a slap in the face to us
as African-American lawmakers."2 19 In South Carolina, tension
erupted from a proposal to implement a fifteen-year, post-
sentence waiting period. 220 After one legislator brought an
African American with a felony conviction before the legisla-
ture, the bill's sponsor passed out copies of an old newspaper
article on the man's crime, on which he had written "Democ-
ratic poster boy for murderers' right to vote." 221 This prompted
another legislator to call the act "Willie Horton race-baiting."222
Thus, many legislators do not appear to be any more sensitive
to arguments of disparate impact than are the courts. 223
Despite the somewhat narrow reforms of felon disfran-
chisement laws in state legislatures, it is important to note that
states have changed their laws. Regardless of their rationales
for doing so, legislatures have taken important steps to accom-
plish what legal challenges have thus far failed to do.
III. MAKING THE RIGHT TO VOTE A TRUE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A canvass of recent decisions by courts and legislatures
poses the question of whether litigation or legislation is the
best route to achieve change in felon disfranchisement laws. At
first glance, legislation appears to be the more viable route to
accomplish that goal because it has been the more successful of
the two approaches. 224 Because voting is a fundamental right,
219. Id.
220. Wise, House Doesn't Kill Bill, supra note 130; Wise, Criminal Exam-
ple, supra note 130.
221. Wise, House Doesn't Kill Bill, supra note 130 (discussing the actions of
State Representative John Graham Altman).
222. Id. (quoting Altman: 'If it's blacks losing the right to vote, then they
have to quit committing crimes.").
223. Although legislatures as a whole seem reluctant to view felon disfran-
chisement as a racial issue, it is most often African American legislators who
propose to change felon disfranchisement laws within their respective states.
Similarly, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) has repeatedly introduced
bills to enfranchise unincarcerated felons for federal elections. See supra note
216.
224. For another assessment of the legislation-versus-litigation debate, see
Symposium, supra note 74, at 282-84. Professor Saunders argues that litiga-
tion under the Voting Rights Act is the best route, commenting that "I do not
think [the issue of felon disfranchisement] can very easily be addressed by leg-
islation." Id.; see also Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1839, 1963 (2002) (commenting that "[s]tate legislatures offer a safe
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however, states should be forced to eliminate felon disfran-
chisement laws, without the option of restoring them. Legisla-
tures may provide the quicker solution, but individual state
legislation does not solve the entire problem, nor does it recog-
nize and remedy the severity of this national practice. Despite
changes to laws in recent years and through the latter half of
the twentieth century, over five million adults remain disfran-
chised. Legislative changes do not go far enough and are out of
step with public opinion on the issue, both domestically 225 and
internationally. 226 Voting is a fundamental right, and courts
need to take that notion seriously by changing their approach
to felon disfranchisement laws; approaching felon disfran-
chisement using a strict scrutiny standard of review-as is
done with other restrictions on the right to vote-will ensure
that voting is a true fundamental right.
Awaiting further piecemeal reforms through legislation
contradicts the notion that voting is a fundamental right and
creates difficulties that cannot cure the problem. One of the
biggest problems with legislation is that states are still picking
and choosing who to enfranchise, drawing categorical lines
based on correctional status or type of conviction; these factors
should not vary the right to vote. 227 Further, enfranchising
those with convictions is not a cause that is politically "safe." It
may be unpopular to advocate for the rights of those convicted
of a felony, 228 but a fundamental right such as voting is not con-
and, empirically speaking, effective route to reform" and that those seeking to
litigate should find new strategies with which to challenge certain aspects of
felon disfranchisement); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 27, at 755 (concluding,
in 1973, that "the legislative process provides a potentially more comprehen-
sive and constructive course"); Martine J. Price, Note, Addressing Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POLY 369, 407 (2002)
(concluding that "[e]fforts to attack disenfranchisement laws should be concen-
trated on the state and local legislatures"); Shapiro, supra note 81, at 564-65
(arguing that "vigorous litigation under the Voting Rights Act" is the best way
for challengers of felon disfranchisement to proceed).
225. See Manza et al., supra note 207, at 280-82 (showing that eighty per-
cent of survey participants supported re-enfranchising upon completion of sen-
tence, and about sixty percent supported re-enfranchising all non-incarcerated
persons).
226. See generally ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 58.
227. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
228. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 308. Keyssar comments that "convicted
felons-mostly minority males, many of them young-probably possess nega-
tive political leverage: it would be costly to any politician to embrace their
cause." Id. Similarly, Professor Saunders has observed, "I cannot imagine that
[a bill enfranchising felons] would pass, certainly not in an election year. It is
2004]
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ferred only to certain classes of people, even if a given group is
politically unpopular. Also, legislative change within a state is
not safe from potential future change by a different state group
of legislators.
Given low turnout rates, perhaps only a small percentage
of the disfranchised population would vote. Actual participa-
tion, however, is irrelevant; the question is not one of choosing
to vote, but rather one about having the right to make that
choice. Thus, while state legislatures have taken some steps
toward reform, they are not the appropriate forum, or at least
should not supplant legal challenges. Most states have focused
only on enfranchising those who have completed their sen-
tences. While this is progress, the changes do not bring the
laws in step with the notion that voting is a fundamental right
for all, absent a measure narrowly-tailored to a compelling
state interest. Eliminating felon disfranchisement laws through
the judicial process will create uniformity and better serve the
vision of a democratic government elected through the exercise
of a fundamental right.
As the laws stand, they create confusion,22 9 discrimina-
a very difficult argument for anyone to make politically and I do not believe
our legislators to be that brave." Symposium, supra note 74, at 284; Sasha
Abramsky, Barring Democracy, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 17, 2000, available at
http://www.motherjones.comlnews-wire/felonvote.html (observing that felon
disfranchisement "is an issue you would expect the Democrats to be hammer-
ing on .... [y]et because politicians of all political stripes are terrified of ap-
pearing 'soft on crime,' few ... have taken up this cause"); see also Avery
Johnson, Weighing the Pros and Cons of Felon Voting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
2004, at A4. See generally KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (discussing the conver-
gence of Republicans and Democrats taking "tough-on-crime" stances to main-
tain political support).
Legislative action has been less a product of committed politicians than
the active persistence of particular lobbying groups, such as the NAACP, the
ACLU, and the League of Women Voters, along with other church and labor
groups. See generally KALOGERAS, supra note 124 (noting the various organi-
zations advocating changes to state legislation on felon disfranchisement laws
between 1996 and 2003).
229. See supra note 57. At a 2003 debate of potential Democrat 2004 presi-
dential candidates, Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.) (who later withdrew as a
candidate) expressed satisfaction that his state, Florida, did not disfranchise
felons beyond sentence. Nedra Pickler, Democratic No-Shows Anger NAACP
Leaders, July 14, 2003, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.
cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/07/14/nationalO209EDTO433.DTL. Graham's state-
ment is particularly surprising, given that Florida is often targeted as having
one of the most egregious practices of felon disfranchisement, Graham once
served as Florida governor (which would place him at the head of the pardon
process), and in 2002 Graham voted against enfranchising those who have
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tion,230 and unnecessary administrative problems. 231 There
must be a legal, widespread, and binding change in precedent
abolishing felon disfranchisement laws as they stand. Because
individual state legislatures cannot accomplish that goal,
courts should remain the primary forum for challenges to felon
disfranchisement laws.
CONCLUSION
By failing to treat felon disfranchisement laws the same as
other restrictions on the right to vote, courts have failed to give
the right to vote its true status as a fundamental right. As a re-
sult, millions of people are disfranchised and effectively re-
moved from the democratic process. If courts apply the same
strict scrutiny standard to felon disfranchisement laws that
they have applied to other restrictions on suffrage, it becomes
clear that the laws are not narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest and are therefore unconstitutional. Although
some state legislatures have amended their laws in recent
years to become less restrictive, courts remain the proper venue
for challenges to these laws. If the right to vote is fundamental,
then felon disfranchisement is impermissible and only courts
can fully eliminate this practice.
completed their sentences for federal elections, following a debate in which
Florida was cited as an example of a state disfranchising this group. 148
CONG. REC. S797, S801, S809 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002).
230. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
231. As of November 2002, Florida had a backlog of 81,000 cases of persons
applying for restoration of voting rights and the chairman of the Florida Pa-
role Commission commented, "I don't think we'll ever eliminate the backlog
with the current resources we have." Wyatt Olson, Barred for Life, NEW TIMES
BROWARD-PALM BEACH, Dec. 26, 2002. In Alabama, the restoration process
can take up to two years, and understaffing problems exacerbate the issue.
White, supra note 100.
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